



AndRadar: Fast Discovery of Android Applications in Alternative Markets




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Low infection rates?






Google: Android Security From The Ground Up (VirusBulletin 2013)

- The Core of the Matter (NDSS13)
- The Company You Keep (WWW14)

0.0009%

0.28%

AV vendors paint a different picture...



Motivation




- How are malicious apps distributed?
 - Official Google Play Store
 - Torrents, One-Click Hosters
 - Websites, Blogs, ...
 - Alternative App Markets



- How wide-spread are malicious apps, how often are they downloaded?
- Do alternative markets employ security measures?
- Collect metadata for malware analysis
 - Andrubis, AndroTotal


Market Metadata: Google Play





Market Metadata: Google Play





Outline



- Market Characterization
- Android Market Radar (AndRadar)
- Evaluation and Case Study
- Future Work and Conclusion

Market Characterization



- Alternative markets are popular because of ...
 - Country gaps (e.g. no paid apps in Google Play China)
 - Promotion
 - Specific needs and specialization
- Preliminary study on 8 alternative marketplaces
 - Crawled them entirely between July and Nov 2013
 - Downloaded 318,515 apps









(1) Distribution of Unwanted Apps



Do markets distribute known, unwanted apps?

- Yes, they do!
- 5-8% malicious apps in whole dataset
 10+ AV detections, excluding adware
- Some markets specialize in adware/"madware"






(2) Publication of malicious apps



Do markets allow the publication of malicious apps?

- Yes, they do!
- Ranking based on number of published apps
- Well visible and known to market operators
- Top authors publish both benign and malicious apps




(3) Distinctive metadata



Do malicious apps have distinctive metadata?

- Yes, they do!
- Malicious apps slightly larger than goodware
 - → Additional malicious code in repackaged apps
- Malicious apps are downloaded more often
 - → Inflation of ranking with app rank boosting services




(4) Market Overlap



How are markets related to each other?

Markets share up to 47% MD5s, 75% package names



getjar 15% andapponline 36% 22% 59% 59% fdroid 31% 15% 12% 19%13% 32% pandaapp

Intersection by package name

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AndRadar Design Goals




- Discover apps in markets in real-time
- Distribution of apps across markets
- Increasing space and time requirements
- Meta information dynamic

 regular crawling of apps
- Crawling of complete markets becomes infeasible
 - Plethora of alternative markets
 - ~ 196 in October 2011 (Vidas et al. CODASPY13)
 - ~ 500 in Juniper Threats Report March 2012/2013
 - ~ 89 in our market study in June 2013

AndRadar Architecture





App Discovery



- Lightweight identifier to select target apps
- Package name uniquely identifies app on device
- Package name identifies app in markets
- Part of an app's "Branding"




App Discover: AppChina





App Discovery: Appszoom






App Matching



- Match downloaded app to malicious app in seed
- Different levels of confidence based on
 - Package name
 - MD5 hash
 - Fingerprint of developer's certificate
 - Method signatures



Collected Metadata



- Continuous monitoring of discovered apps
- Harvest meta information from market listing
 - Upload date
 - Description
 - Screenshots
 - Number of downloads
 - User ratings
 - Reviews
 - Other apps by the same author
 - Delete date

Outline




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Overall performance



- Track tens of thousands of apps per market/day
- Tracked 20,000 apps/1,500 app deletions




Application Lifecycles




- Normal Lifecycle: Market deletes app after it is detected by AVs
- Market Self-Defense:
 Market deletes app before it is detected by AVs

Malware Hopping: market reaction time App is republished after detection "Failover" strategy tav t_{del} ^Lpub first crawl date app app app published deleted detected by AVs in market from market

Market Reaction Time



Community Reaction Time



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Future Work



- Automated notification system for markets
- Extend app discovery in markets based on
 - Application name
 - Image characteristics (icon, screenshots)
 - Description of functionality
- Versioning of malicious apps
- Identify fraud in markets ("App rank boosting")
 - Inflated download numbers
 - Fake ratings and reviews

Conclusion



- In-depth measurement on 8 alternative markets
- AndRadar to discover malicious apps in real-time
- Tracking of app distribution across markets
- Collect metadata about apps
 - Branding
 - Updates
 - Download numbers
 - Ratings & reviews
- Expose publishing patterns of malware authors
 - "Failover" strategies to migrate between markets



Questions?

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Malicious App Seed




- Feed of known malware or unwanted apps
- Continuous stream of apps from ...
 - Manually vetted malware repository (VirusShare)
 - Submission feed from VirusTotal based on # of AV signatures
 - Submissions to Andrubis based on dynamic analysis result
- Seed format: APK files

<Package name, Certificate, Method signatures, MD5>

1Mobile






Anzhi





Aptoide






CoolAPK





F-Droid






Lenovo





Moborobo






Nduoa





SlideME





Wandoujia





Z-Android



